>>933>But it's false consciousness, wouldn't you think?
soykaf, boy, you just opened a whole new can of worms. Alright, here we go…
>but in the end you're just chatting with ELIZA.
Consider the following statements:
P: "I am conscious."
Q: "You are conscious."
R: "ELIZA is conscious."
For me to claim P, I perceive my own consciousness, which is recognizable to myself as an experience I have.
For me to claim Q, it gets more complex. I have to make a series of inferences, all of which are very well supported by scientific knowledge, but all of which have the minute potential to be false. I will have to start from P, and then observe myself and my actions. I decide, "I'm human, and I act a certain way while conscious." I can then infer: "A human acting this way is conscious." Then, I turn to you. "Hey, you're human (inferring, because you look similar to me and other humans I know)" and you act in a similar way that I act when conscious." From that, I infer that you are conscious. That's certainly a qualitatively different process from proving P, right? Now here's the big question:
How do you prove (or, for that matter, disprove) R?